Sydney Morning Herald September 6, 2009 - Hundreds of people lit candles and held prayers in East Timor on Sunday to mark the 10th anniversary of one of the worst massacres in the country's history.
Sitting stoically outside an incomplete church in the southern East Timor city of Suai, where up to 200 civilians including priests were killed on September 6, 1999, Manuel Soares prayed silently for his dead son and kidnapped daughter Juliana dos Santos, or affectionately known as Alola.
Indonesian military group Laksaur vice-commander Egidio Manek had "taken" her away as a war trophy and forced her to marry him in neighbouring West Timor, he said.
"Every month, I send her some clothing for the three children she now has," he added.
East Timor's First Lady Kirsty Sword Gusmao had named her non-profit organisation Alola Foundation in her honour.
"The people who suffered in 1999, those families won't even come to the church," Soares said.
"For the victims, everything is ruined and broken. I came here today to get away from the feeling."
The Indonesian Army and paramilitaries went on the rampage after the 1999 referendum, killing around 1,400 people and forcing hundreds of thousands to flee to other parts of Indonesia.
Australian-led United Nations peacekeepers restored order, ending an occupation that is estimated to have claimed around 100,000 lives through fighting, disease and starvation.
Soares said all he wanted was to see the perpetrators be tried for the human rights violations that happened between 1975 and 1999, but his patience was wearing thin.
"We want justice, but it never happens. They release all the criminals and all the people who were involved in the killings," he said.
The United Nations last Tuesday had condemned the release of Indonesian former militia leader Martenus Bere, who was detained in East Timor on August 8, five years after being indicted for his role in the 1999 Suai Church massacre.
East Timor's government has refused to confirm Bere's release but the Indonesian foreign ministry had said the man had already been moved from detention to Indonesia's embassy in Dili.
"If the government or the UN dared enough, they could go and arrest the militias," Soares said angrily.
"They are all liars. They just talk and make promises. All the organisations who claim they help victims, they are just talking and talking," he added.
East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin
ETLJB 9 April 2009 Melbourne In response to Jill Jolliffe's report in The Age on 1st April 2009, it should be noted that there were several massacres in Dili. The first occurred on 7th December 1975 when thousands of Chinese and Timorese were murdered.
A second Dili massacre took place the day after the Indonesian invasion when over a hundred citizens forced to the wharf witnessed the murders of Roger East and more than a hundred victims including Isabel Lobato and Rosa Muki Bonaparte.
Though the cemetery is in a suburb of Dili, I submit that to name it the Dili massacre marginalises all the other massacres that took place in the city during the Indonesian occupation.
See James Dunn 'East Timor a rough passage to independence' page 292 for details of massacres outside Dili.
Though I don’t suppose the demonstration at the Pope’s mass at Taci Tolu in 1989 could be described as ‘taking to the streets,’ it was an extremely courageous act since it took place in the presence of thousands of Indonesian soldiers dressed as scout masters or tourists. They were armed with cameras which they used to record the demonstrators, many of whom were subsequently disappeared. Brave Timorese youths also unfurled banners which had to be smuggled into Taci Tolu through military checkpoints. Rods designed in interlocking sections placed their carriers in particular danger.
Taci-Tolu is a place where thousands of Timorese had been butchered to the extent that people attending the Pope's mass wept as they entered the arena. ‘We are walking on the bones of our loved-ones.’
For weeks before the Pope's arrival, the site at Taci Tolu was out-of-bounds and bulldozers were observed clearing the grounds. There was much speculation about the disposal of the remains of many thousands of Timorese.
When the youths carrying the banners ran towards the dais where the Pope was standing, the batik-shirt brigade moved in and began to beat anyone who got in their way. A group of Timorese standing close to the dais saw what was happening; they found the courage to raise their fists. The cameras were adjusted to include them. Uniformed police appeared from nowhere hurling chairs and clouds of dust began to rise as if the Taci Tolu massacres were being repeated.
A hundred or so Timorese found the courage to try to help the protesters; they were beaten into the earth with riot sticks and chairs. A Filipino journalist's camera was torn from his hands and the film ripped out. I saw one man clutching his fractured jaw as a scout master continued to kick him.
A reporter from Darwin told me that when the protest began he asked his Indonesian press minder what was written on the banners. While looking straight at them, the minder had replied: ‘What banners?’
The banners read: MAUBERE PEOPLE WELCOMES PAPPA. LONG LIVE FRETILIN. VIVA FRETILIN. POPE SAVE EAST TIMOR.
The Santa Cruz massacre did not take place during a funeral procession. When a Timorese burial takes place the mourners lay the Bitter Flowers. When time has elapsed so that the grief has lessened the ceremony of the Sweet Flowers is held. On 28 October, Gomes, a student activist, had sought refuge in the church of San Antonio de Motael. He was shot in the stomach by an Indonesian soldier in front of dozens of astonished witnesses.
The laying of the Sweet Flowers for Sabastião was a commemoration of the burial that had occurred two weeks earlier. On the morning of November 12th, thousands of East Timorese marched from the church of San Antonio de Motael to Santa Cruz cemetery after attending a memorial mass for Sabastião. Marchers were harassed by police and intelligence agents, who pelted the procession with rocks. As mourners entered the Santa Cruz cemetery to lay the sweet flowers Indonesian soldiers marching slowly and deliberately fired at them at point-blank range.
As to the numbers of the dead, Max Stahl told me he saw as many as four hundred manacled, desperate Timorese being driven off after the massacre.
A Paz e Possivel em Timor-Leste (Peace is Possible in Timor-Leste) published a list of their findings into the number of massacre victims in leading Portuguese newspapers in November, 1992. Jose Ramos-Horta described how the data was obtained:
"... has been compiled by 12 teams of East Timorese students, school teachers, priests, nuns, nurses, paramedics, hospital staff, workers at the morgues, totalling 72 researchers, working round the clock for three months, interviewing household members in each bairro, immediately after 12 November 1991.”
The preliminary report reached Lisbon in February and was handed over to two specialist groups in Portugal that had been investigating human rights abuses in East Timor for more than 10 years. A copy was channelled to Amnesty International for independent verification.
It took six months for the mass of detailed information sent from East Timor to be processed and analysed. The researchers took extreme care in double-checking each piece of information."
The Lists: 271 killed; 278 wounded; 103 hospitalised; 270 disappeared.
Google's cache of http://www.etan.org/timor/
For an eye-witness report of the Santa Cruz massacre Google Democracy Now via Santa Cruz massacre.
Max Stahl’s film footage and the subsequent reporting by Americans Amy Goodman and Alan Nairn broke the backs of the Jakarta Lobbyist's compromised assurances that the Timorese fared well under Indonesian rule. When Alan threw himself over Amy in an attempt to prevent her from being assaulted by the butt of an M16 rifle being wielded by an Indonesian soldier, he took the blow intended for her, which fractured his skull.
The fact that witnesses survived the massacres in Dili is something of a miracle.
I invite valid criticism of anything I publish in the interest of accuracy.
Jakarta Post Saturday, February 21, 2009 9:41 PM Lessons from the Khmer Rouge tribunal Fitria Chairani , PHNOM PENH | Sat, 02/21/2009 1:22 PM | Opinion - On Feb.17, 2009, the ECCC (Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia) held the opening session of its first trial, the trial of Kiang Guek Eav, alias Duch. He is accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity while he was the head of the notorious S-21 Prison in Phnom Penh.
Most victims taken to the prison during that period were tortured and forced to confess by way of electric shocks, beatings and whippings, placing bags over their heads and pouring water into their noses, before being bludgeoned to death or "smashed" in a field on the city's outskirts. Women, children and even babies were among those murdered.
Duch and four other senior Khmer Rouge cadres are alleged to be responsible for the deaths of 1.7 million people from 1975-1979. The others are the Khmer Rouge second-in-command, Nuon Chea; the former foreign minister Ieng Sary; the former social affairs minister Ieng Thirith; and the former head of state Khieu Samphan.
The initial hearing of the trial took two days, which mainly discussed the role of the civil parties, the admissibility of evidence and the witness lists, as well as preliminary objections brought by the defense. It was a big day for the people of Cambodia, as they saw Duch for the first time in decades (some of the victims had not even seen Duch since they were detained in S-21 prison).
Thirty years have elapsed since the occurrence of such brutality. The trial was finally set up, and showed the significant progress made toward the truth-seeking process in Cambodia upon those most responsible for committing such extreme crimes during the Khmer Rouge era.
Finally, the ECCC was established in 2003 under an agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia. Up until this present moment, the ECCC agenda is to put the above five people on trial, with the debated notion of putting more accused people on trial on the agenda. This is due to the history of such brutality, which involved more people that could be deemed the most responsible for the crimes committed.
To open such a traumatic history is not easy. This is proved by the controversy that occurred during the legal process. Conflict of interest is often raised, especially when there are many people that were involved as members of the Khmer Rouge.
In comparison, specifically with regard to the truth-seeking process, Indonesia has also been through some difficult situations in terms of conflict that could possibly be alleged as crimes against humanity, specifically on gross human rights violations. Among others are the alleged gross human rights violations in East Timor.
Although East Timor is no longer part of Indonesia, it is still part of Indonesia's history and any incident that occurred there can be deemed Indonesia's responsibility if it took place between 1974 and 1999.
Indeed, the Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East Timor, established right after the secession, successfully convicted 84 individuals and acquitted three; however that panel only had limited jurisdiction, which was to prosecute crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences and torture committed between Jan. 1, 1999, and Oct. 25, 1999. Such a process also excluded a number of Indonesian nationals, who were allegedly involved in the atrocities.
However, in 2007, the final report by the Indonesian and East Timor Truth and Friendship Commission as mandated by the UNTAET Regulation No. 10/2001 has taken one significant step toward facing the truth. It has revealed several human rights violations committed between 1974 until 1999, including ones allegedly committed by Indonesian Military officers.
It came as a surprise when the report found that 84,200 civilians had died between the late 1970s until the early 1980s due to acts by the Indonesian Military, by the bombing of civilian territory, the destruction of food supplies, the forced movement of people away from Fretilin territory, as well as denying food supplies from international aid agencies and organizations.
Moreover, torture and execution were also reported to be repetitively conducted in an inhumane manner by incarcerating detainees without adequate food and water in pitch-dark cells, after being stripped naked and tortured continuously. There were also numbers of detainees killed after being severely beaten. Attacks on civilians were reported, with cases of short-distance shootings, grenade attacks, executions, rapes and sexual harassment, mutilations and many other extreme punishments.
In addition to that, systematic murder and forced disappearances occurred during the early Indonesian occupation, specifically during the period 1978-1979 and 1983-1984 to the people allegedly actively involved with the resistance movement. Forced movement and mass destruction occurred just before the referendum in1999, in order to secure the pro-integration position in the referendum.
These gross human rights violations must not be ignored or tolerated. As a civilized nation, one that has committed itself to the rule of law and human rights, Indonesia has undisputed obligations to act upon such violations. It has to face up to the allegation its military, police and civilian government might be "institutionally responsible" or even that some personnel are "individually responsible" for "gross human rights violations" before and after East Timor's independence referendum in 1999.
Hopefully, there will be more action taken following the commission's report, as a sign that, indeed, this nation is ready to face the truth and bring anyone responsible to justice. This does not apply only to East Timor of course, but other places of conflict such as Aceh and Papua. In this case, the Cambodian precedent of a truth-seeking process could be very useful.
The writer is currently working as a legal intern at the Office of Co-Prosecutors at the ECCC.
East Timor UC Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center - On May 20, 2005 the Special Panel for Serious Crimes (SPSC) completed more than four years of trials arising from crimes committed during the 1999 violence following the referendum in which East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia.
Although the work of the SPSC was cut short by a decision of the United Nations to end the UNMISET missions of which it was a part, it completed 55 trials, most involving relatively low level defendants. In the course of these trials, 84 individuals were convicted and 3 acquitted. Detailed reports about many of these cases can be found at the website of the Judicial System Monitoring Programme, which monitored the activities of the Special Panel on an ongoing basis.
By arrangement with the SPSC and its coordinating Judge, the Honorable Phillip Rapoza, the U.C. Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center agreed to provide continuing public access to electronic copies of official versions, provided by the Tribunal, of indictments, motions, and judgments from these 55 cases. Our goal is to ensure continued public access to these important records.
Serious Crimes Unit - Dili, East Timor
Prosecution Section for The Special Panels for Serious Crimes
Through a further agreement with the Deputy Prosecutor General for Serious Crimes, Mr. Carl Da Faria, the U.C. Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center also agreed to take over and maintain the website of the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), which was responsible for prosecuting these cases.
The website ncludes a database compiled by the SCU staff that provides information on all of the cases prosecuted in the Serious Crimes process. The original files from the SPSC and SCU were handed over to the government of East Timor and it is uncertain if, when, or under what conditions public access will be provided to them. Although the last activities of the SPSC and SCU came to an end on June 30, 2005, it is vitally important to preserve the legacy of their efforts and achievements in a form easily available to researchers, practitioners, and the general public.
The trials before the Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East Timor form an important part of the ongoing global enterprise aimed at providing accountability for major violations of international humanitarian law. They also provide a cornerstone of the historical record of the 1999 violence in East Timor. Although they received scant international media attention while they were being conducted, the jurisprudence of these trials, the historical documentation they contain, and their contribution to contemporary efforts towards achieving international justice, deserve serious public attention.
Special Reports and Papers
The trial monitors and other researchers periodically produce special reports and papers providing thematically coherent, in-depth analysis. All past reports can be browsed and downloaded through the Special Reports Archive.
Current Reports on East Timor:
Indifference and Accountability: The United Nations and the Politics of International Justice Special Report (via the East-West Center website)
15 January 2009 MANILA (AFP)--East Timor President Jose Ramos-Horta said here Thursday he opposes putting Indonesian soldiers on trial for human rights abuses carried out during the fight for independence.
East Timor gained formal independence in 2002 after a bloody 24-year occupation by neighbor Indonesia that led to the deaths of up to 200,000 people and there have been calls to try the perpetrators.
"I would oppose it for as long as I am president," said the 1996 Nobel laureate, a former leader of the independence movement that resisted Jakarta's annexation of the territory after the departure of colonial ruler Portugal.
Giving a lecture at a Manila university, Ramos-Horta said there had been calls from within East Timor as well as abroad for such trials, but that the majority of people did not favor such a move.
He said he always told compatriots who held this view to "go elect a new president."
"We became free in 1999 because the Indonesians also liberated themselves," he said, referring to the street protests that led to the downfall of the long-serving Indonesian president Suharto, under whose rule Indonesian troops seized East Timor in 1975.
Calling for such a genocide tribunal now after Dili and Jakarta made peace would be like stabbing Indonesia's leaders in the back, said Ramos-Horta, who is on a six-day visit to the Philippines.
Ramos-Horta was elected president in 2007 after also serving as prime minister and foreign minister of the tiny state.
Source : Dowjones Business News
Crimes Against Humanity Perpetrators Released - Judicial System Monitoring Program Press Release 20 June 2008
This last week has seen the release of convicted militia leader Joni Marques, and others, from Dili’s Becora prison.
Following Timor-Leste’s first trial for crimes against humanity, in 2001, Marques was sentenced to 33 years 4 months jail. Marques led the Team Alpha militia who, in 1999, conducted attacks on civilians in the Lospalos area.
Militia members themselves testified they conducted a violent intimidation campaign prior to independence. Marques’ crimes include torture and several murders, including those of a group of priests and nuns.
“On any reading of the law, this liberal treatment of Marques and his fellow militiamen appears unorthodox. The freedom of such perpetrators may bring into question Timor-Leste’s international human rights commitments. However laudable in spirit, attempts to move on from the country’s legacy of violence must not outweigh the rule of law,” said Timotio de Deus, JSMP’s Director.
At a 2007 hearing of the Truth and Friendship Commission, Marques repeated his admission of militia involvement. All remaining detainees from Timor’s crimes against humanity trials were recently granted clemency.
Under the broad terms of a Presidential decree, many of these sentences, including Marques’, were halved. In 2004, previous clemency measures under then President Gusmão reduced his sentence to 25 years.
On 13 June 2008, a court order granting parole, or conditional release, allowed this criminal to walk free. Even given deductions for pre-trial detention and early release under penal procedure, this looks premature.
A generous calculation of Marques’ time served, from his capture in 1999, would see him out of jail next year. Parole may, however, be granted to certain longstanding inmates who have displayed good prison behaviour.
By any reasonable standard, Marques, who escaped briefly in 2006, ought surely to be excluded under this condition. A ‘good prison behaviour’ proviso also applies to the clemency measures on which Marques’ release is based.
JSMP has learned that conditional release has now been granted to others convicted of crimes against humanity. Among those reportedly released are Marques’ co-accused Paolo and João da Costa, and former Sakunar militia member Mateus Lao. The court would not comment on the rationale for these releases. JSMP has applied for copies of relevant warrants.
For further information or media interviews please contact: Timotio de Deus Director, JSMP Email: timotio@jsmp.minihub.org Land line: +670 3323883 Mobile Phone : +670 7292909
East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin - Latest legal news, information and analysis from East Timor in English.
Asian Centre for Human Rights 2007 On the sidelines of the ongoing ASEAN summit in Manila, Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda called on the Indonesia-East Timor Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) which was set up to examine violence surrounding East Timor's 1999 independence vote to ignore a UN boycott threat. The United Nations recently warned that it would not send any of its officials who served in East Timor to testify before the CTF unless the CTF changes its terms of reference by dropping the provision of recommending amnesties. The United Nations must remember that in 2005 it had to change the terms of reference of the UN Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 before the Government of Indonesia allowed the experts to visit the country.
The “UN Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999” in its report in July 2005 recommended that if Indonesia fails to strengthen its judicial and prosecutorial capacity “by assembling a team of international judicial and legal experts to provide independent specialist legal advice to the Office of the Attorney General on international criminal law, international humanitarian law and international human rights standards”, the crimes against humanity in then East Timor must be referred to the UN Security Council for the establishment of an international tribunal.
Indonesia has indeed failed to strengthen its judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms as recommended by the UN Commission of Experts.
I. Failure of the chained watchdog, Komnas HAM
After the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia claims to have further empowered the National Human Rights Commission, Komnas HAM pursuant to the Law No 39 of 1999 concerning Human Rights. In reality, Komnas HAM is a chained watchdog.
Under Article 19 of Law No. 26 of 2000, the Komnas HAM is authorised to inquire any alleged gross human rights violations without subpoena powers. Based on this inquiry of the Komnas HAM, the Attorney General takes the final decision under Article 21 whether to order further inquiries or not for eventual prosecution. But, Komnas HAM does not have the power to issue subpoena. Since the Komnas HAM in the first place is legally constrained through denial of subpoena powers to conduct proper inquiries, it cannot take logical steps which will force the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives, or DPR) or the Attorney General to take appropriate measures. This is nothing but an effective procedural obstacle to provide impunity.
The United Nations Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 found that “the lack of access to evidence and suspects in Indonesia is a critical challenge impeding the progress of the serious crimes processes in Timor-Leste”. This observation is applicable to all human rights violations because of the lack of the denial of subpoena powers.
Nonetheless, Komnas HAM submitted inquiry reports into the six alleged gross violations of human rights (Trisakti 1998, Semanggi I 1998, Semanggi, May 1998 riots, Wasior 2001-2002, and Wamena 2003) but no action was taken by the Attorney General.
In the 1998 killing of four students at Trisakti University and nine demonstrators at Semanggi intersection and the 1999 killing of an additional four demonstrators at Semanggi, the Komnas HAM after its investigation concluded that the killings were gross human rights violations. Komnas HAM submitted these cases to the Attorney General's office (AGO) for prosecution. However, the AGO argued that it could not prosecute the accused in these cases unless the House of Representatives, the DPR classified them as gross human rights violations. In July 2001, the House announced that there were no gross human rights violations during the violence at Trisakti University in 1998 or during the Semanggi incidents in 1998 and 1999. The DPR refused to reconsider its 2001 decision.
An adhoc team of the Komnas HAM inquired into the 1998 abductions of between 12 and 14 pro-democracy activists. The Indonesian military TNI refused to cooperate in the investigation. Nonetheless based on other testimonies and evidence, Komnas HAM concluded that all victims still missing were dead and identified the suspects but failed to release the names of the suspects. The AGO stated that it could not prosecute these crimes unless the DPR declared them as “gross human rights violations”.
At least 1,217 people died in three days of rioting in Jakarta in May 1998 in which members of the ethnic Chinese community were primarily targeted. Hundreds of shops and buildings belonging to them were looted and burnt down by the rioters. About 85 ethnic Chinese women and girls were sexually assaulted including 52 of them being raped. Despite the ad hoc team of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) identifying some 20 military officers including former Armed Forces commander General Wiranto and former Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) chief Prabowo Subianto and some civilians as being behind the May 1998 riots in Jakarta, the Attorney General refused to order further investigation that would have led to prosecution of the perpetrators.
In a series of sweeping operations carried out in the villages of Wondiboi, Yomakan, Wondamawi I and Isei after an attack on their camp at CV Vatika Papuana Perkasa (VPP) company base camp in Wondiboi village, Wasior district, West Papua on 13 June 2001, the Brimob (mobile police) allegedly killed four civilians, raped one; five disappeared, tortured many, 38 and burnt down dozens of homes. In similar sweeping retaliatory operations in Wamena town, and some villages in Wamena Sub-district after alleged members of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) reportedly broke into a military arsenal in Wamena in June 2003, the Indonesian military killed 9 civilians, tortured 38, arbitrarily arrested 15 of them and displaced thousands from their villages.
In its investigative reports on both the above mentioned cases which were submitted to the Attorney General's Office in September 2004, Komnas HAM reportedly named as many as 168 members of the military and police as suspects. But, no prosecution proceedings have been initiated.
II. Failure of the Human Rights Courts
The human rights courts in Indonesia are often moved by nationalist fervour rather than by any judicial considerations and undermined the efforts of Komnas HAM to expose human rights violations and bring perpetrators to account by a number of court decisions regarding Komnas HAM's jurisdiction or authority.
With regard to the killing of three Papuan students and the torture of over 100 others in Abepura, Papua on 7 December 2000, Komnas HAM named 25 security personnel to be guilty of killing and torture. However, only two of these suspects were charged by the Attorney General's Office, with no adequate explanation. As if that was not enough, a special Human Rights Court in Makassar acquitted two senior police officers who were found guilty by the National Human Rights Commission. The two accused police officers, Brigadier General Johny Wainal Usman and Senior Commissioner Daud Sihombing were charged with command responsibility for the killings and torture. They faced a maximum penalty of life imprisonment if convicted. But Chief Prosecutor I Ketut Murtika recommended the minimum penalty of only 10 years, claiming the two accused had “served the nation” and “did not have malicious intentions”. The court went a few steps further to exonerate both the accused officers and rule that they were not guilty of allowing their subordinates to torture and kill civilians during the raid.
The gross human rights violations that occurred before 2000 could be investigated only by an ad hoc human rights court, not Komnas HAM. Such an adhoc court could be formed only by a decision of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives, or DPR) but for the DPR to know enough about an incident to approve the formation of a court, a thorough investigation was necessary.
The DPR following Komnas HAM's recommendations approved the establishment of an ad hoc court to try human rights abuses related to the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident and in East Timor in 1999.
With regard to the massacre at Tanjung Priok in North Jakarta of 1984 massacre in which at least 33 unarmed Muslim protesters, 14 police and military personnel were charged. In 2004, the human rights court acquitted the two most senior defendants, while 12 others were sentenced to between two and 10 years. Jakarta High Court in July 2005 overturned the convictions of the 12 officers, which means that not one person has been convicted for the incident.
The UN Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 in its report of July 2005 stated that the Adhoc tribunal on Timor-Leste “conducted the inquiry stage of the ad hoc judicial process in a comprehensive, credible and objective manner, in compliance with international standards applicable to pro justitia inquiries. The adhoc tribunal established “relevant crime base, linkage evidence and alleged involvement of individuals from military and civilian institutions. From the list of about 22 suspects, the Attorney-General indicted 18 individuals from the military and the police who were directly in command in East Timor at the material time, as well as two civilian government officials and a militia Leader”. Of 18 defendants brought before the ad hoc human rights court, 12 were acquitted and six convicted. Jakarta High Court later exonerated five of the convicted, while the sixth remained free pending appeal.
III. Why UN must boycott?
The UN Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 concluded that “the prosecutions before the Ad Hoc Court were manifestly inadequate, primarily owing to a lack of commitment on the part of the prosecution, as well as to the lack of expertise, experience and training in the subject-matter, deficient investigations and inadequate presentation of inculpatory material at trial”.
Indonesia does not have a single case including the killing of human rights activist, Mr Munir Said Thalib to prove that it has any political will to establish accountability for any human rights violation. The main mandate of the Commission on Truth and Friendship established by Indonesia and East Timor is to “recommend amnesty for those involved in human rights violations who cooperate fully in revealing the truth”.
Given the unwillingness of both East Timor and Indonesia, it is unlikely that the UN Security Council will establish any tribunal to establish accountability for the gross human rights violations in East Timor. But, the United Nations must boycott the tribunal. It would be a shame if the UN were to put its legitimacy to a process which will amount to endorsing or condoning and therefore fostering impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights in East Timor.
East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin - Latest legal news, information and analysis from Timor-Leste in English.
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In the annals of crime of this terrible century, Indonesia's assault against East Timor ranks high, not only because of its scale--perhaps the greatest death toll relative to the population since the Holocaust--but because it would have been so easy to prevent.... [1]
...towards the (Second World) War's end, the Royal Australian Air Force dropped hundreds of thousands of leaflets over Portuguese East Timor in recognition of East Timor's sacrifice for Australia's war effort. This leaflet began with the declaration: "Friends, we will not forget you!" [2]
The struggle for political control in East Timor has reached a decisive turning point. For twenty-four years, the half-island territory has been governed by Indonesia, in spite of international condemnation of that country's rule and persistent diplomatic and military action by groups seeking East Timor's independence. The political upheavals triggered by the economic recession in Indonesia in 1998, which precipitated the fall of the Soeharto regime, led to a radical revision of that country's position on East Timor: for the first time in over two decades, the Indonesian government, led by the caretaker president, B.J. Habibie, acknowledged the possibility of independence for East Timor. A referendum in East Timor is planned for August 1999, but doubts persist about the viability of the plebiscite given ongoing conflict on the island and the difficulties faced by United Nations peacekeepers in ensuring a peaceful interlude prior to the poll. [3] Throughout 1999, Indonesian-backed militias have waged a campai gn of terror in East Timor, leading to deaths, the flight of independence leaders, and the displacement of thousands of persons, some of whom are cut off from essential supplies of food and medicines. [4]
Allegations of Genocide
The international focus on East Timor has once again brought to the foreground longstanding allegations of genocide during the period of Indonesian administration. [5] Most texts on East Timor give prominence to charges of genocide, often including the term in the title of the monograph or report. These claims have not yet been tested in an international court, but the potential for such legal action will become greater if East Timor becomes independent. A charge of genocide would have far-reaching implications not only for Indonesian military and political leaders, but also for the international community, since allegations of complicity by the major powers, particularly Australia, have been made repeatedly. [6]
A comprehensive gathering of evidence supporting a charge of genocide in East Timor, remains a task that can only be undertaken systematically once ongoing conflict on the island is resolved. For the present, available evidence is based on eyewitness accounts, [7] the efforts of investigative journalists [8] and academics, [9] testimony by the leadership of the East Timorese independence movement, [10] and accounts provided by communiques and ex-government officials. [11] The present article will not attempt to assess such evidence in a legalistic manner, but instead will aim only to explore some of the theoretical foundations for a claim of genocide in East Timor and the allegation that western powers such as Australia might have been complicit in such crimes against humanity.
Historical Background
Jardine has provided a succinct summary of the historical events leading up to the present crisis in East Timor. [12] Only a brief review of key historical data will be provided hereunder. East Timor came under Dutch influence in the early sixteenth century, but the official division of the island was only concluded finally in 1913, when East Timor was recognized fully as a Portuguese colony and West Timor was assigned to Dutch colonial rule. The latter territory was incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia in 1950. The colonial history of East Timor was characterized by neglect and stagnation, with the majority of East Timorese continuing to live traditional village lives.
During World War II, the island was occupied by the Japanese after a bitter jungle war against a much smaller Allied commando force including an Australian contingent. Scores of East Timorese suffered starvation, torture, rape, forced labor, and other forms of gross human rights violations at the hands of the Japanese as retribution for the widespread support the East Timorese gave to the Allied forces. Following World War II, the island reverted to Portuguese colonial rule. The prospect of independence came after 1974, when the revolution in Portugal opened the way to the decolonization of its overseas empire. A split in the coalition of the two major parties that emerged in East Timor, widely regarded as the result of Indonesian subversion, led to civil war, with Fretilin (East Timorese Front for Independence) rapidly gaining ascendancy over UDT (The Timorese Democratic Union), both militarily and politically. Observers of the time noted that by the end of the civil war, Fretilin had established an effective and just administration over East Timor and that the party had widespread support. Although Portugal was invited to maintain its authority during the period leading to full independence, the colonial power vacillated, and Fretilin then declared independence.
Using the pretext of the civil war--which in fact had already come to an end--Indonesia invaded the territory in December 1975. The well-trained Fretilin army mounted a stiff resistance, and a bloody struggle continued for several years, even though the invaders officially annexed the territory as a province of Indonesia. During the long period of diplomatic deadlock that followed, Falantil (The East Timorese National Liberation Army) continued to wage a guerrilla war against ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia).
The conflict intensified in 1999 after the interim Indonesian government announced its willingness to hold a referendum on the territory's future. In the months thereafter, daily reports attested to ongoing violence, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and other atrocities occurring throughout the territory. [13] Large numbers of internal refugees were cut off from food, water, and medical supplies. [14] United Nations observers supported the claim that the Indonesian military continued to arm and train local militia groups intent on destroying the influence of the independence movement prior to the poll. Thus, serious doubts remained as to whether a fair and free referendum could be held in East Timor at all.
The history of the last twenty-four years of Indonesian rule in East Timor raises many questions. Most important is how the invasion and subsequent violent struggle in the territory should be construed: as a geopolitically expedient stratagem to prevent instability in the region, as a form of imperial expansionism by a newly formed power, or as a genocide against the East Timorese people. (As will be argued, these possible constructions of the recent history of East Timor are not mutually exclusive.) A further question is whether the world powers, including Australia, should stand accused of passivity and neglect, or of more serious charges of active complicity in genocide or other crimes against humanity. [15]
Definitions and Concepts of Genocide
Lemkin [16] coined the term "genocide" at a pivotal moment in the twentieth century when the systematic Nazi program for the annihilation of European Jewry first became widely known. Lemkin introduced the term to designate a coordinated set of actions that aimed to destroy the essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the ultimate objective of annihilating the groups themselves. That objective could be achieved by the destruction of social and political institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, or religion, and of the economic infrastructure of a group. Lemkin also included wider actions that threatened the security, liberty, health, and dignity of individuals belonging to that group. It is clear that Lemkin's definition arose directly from, and was informed largely by, the Nazi Holocaust. Intent was a critical provision of his formulation, and that cornerstone was consistent with the recognition that the Nazi regime had developed a fully coordinated, systematic plan, supported by extensively documented ideology, a vast bureaucracy, and modern technology, to exterminate European Jewry, and that this mission was central to the raison d'etre of the Nazi regime. [17]
The notion of intent was retained as a central criterion in the "Definition of Genocide," included in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. [18] The Convention's criteria have been criticized, however, by several authorities in the field, with Chalk and Jonassohn claiming that the provisions would not apply accurately to any of the genocides that have occurred since World War II. [19] Criticisms have been directed at the difficulties raised by the need to demonstrate the intent of the perpetrator(s), as well as at the Convention's definition of what constitutes a victim group. Some authorities have favored the inclusion of a cultural form of genocide in which the identity of a group may be destroyed by actions that do not necessarily lead to the physical destruction of the population per se. [20] In addition, as presently defined, the Convention may not cover acts of "autogenocide" such as occurred in Cambodia, or acts of mass murder motivated by political i ntentions alone. Chalk and Jonassohn have attempted to address the problem of group definition by offering a revised formulation of genocide as being "a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator." [21]
Although the issue of intent presents definitional difficulties, many authorities have considered it vital in distinguishing between genocidal acts and other categories of mass human rights violations. [22] According to the Convention, whether killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm represents the outcome of warfare, human rights violations, or genocidal acts depends largely on whether there was an "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group..." (Article II). Chalk and Jonassohn [23] have expressed caution about including forms of genocide in which intent may not be clear. For example, in the course of a war, bombing and famine might threaten the survival of a group even though the intent might have been to quell an uprising or to further other military objectives. Others have defined genocide without making explicit reference to intent. Horowitz expanded the scope of the term to include any "structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a s tate bureaucratic appartus." [24] Charny, in particular, has raised serious objections to a narrow definition of genocide. His "humanistic" definition of genocide included within the term any wanton murder of persons based on any shared characteristic, whether national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, geographical, or ideological. [25] Such a broad definition would not, it seems, require a definite demonstration of intent as a sine qua non to sustain a charge of genocide. In addition, Charny quotes a UN study submitted to the Special Rapporteur on Genocide in 1985. [26] which gave emphasis to the proportionate scale and total number of victims killed in considering a charge of genocide. Thus, there does not appear to be a dear consensus on the defining elements of genocide or where the boundaries of the term should be drawn. Which definition is adopted may be critical to the question of whether the Indonesian rule of East Timor might be regarded as genocidal or not.
A further issue of importance in analyzing the East Timor conflict is the extent to which the Indonesian invasion can be seen as an act of imperialism by an emerging regional power whose status as a nation had only recently been ratified. The new Republic of Indonesia was based on a vast grouping of loosely connected islands and territories with widely differing ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds. The only defining basis for inclusion of territories within Indonesia was that all the islands had fallen under Dutch colonial rule. Apart from East Timor, the fragility of the union has been exacerbated by ongoing opposition to centralist Indonesian rule in territories such as Aceh and Irian Jaya (West Papua), struggles that continue to this day. Thus, the history of the East Timorese invasion might be construed as following a model of imperial expansionism pursued by a newly created and emerging power whose leaders were following the style of harsh colonial repression to which they themselves had been subjected. Kuper has acknowledged the close, if complex relationship between the two historical forces of genocide and colonialism. [27] He pointed out that genocidal massacres against indigenous groups were widely practiced during the period of colonialism. Characteristically, colonialism has been accompanied by a phase of brutal conquest in which genocidal massacres occurred, and a more prolonged period of destruction of the cultural, social, and economic infrastructure of the colonized society. The period of "pacification" often involved economic and political disenfranchisement of the indigenous group, dispossession of land, and the development of an underclass of native citizens who were characterized by the new rulers as inferior and hence open to discrimination and exploitation. Such conditions encouraged ongoing genocidal policies and actions, and spawned resistance groups, liberationist philosophies, and various forms of insurgency warfare. Kuper's characterization is mirrored in Fein,s [28] typology which identifies a category of "developmental" genocide reserved for acts committed in the course of colonialism. Unlike ideological genocides, such as those perpetrated against the Jews by the Nazis or against the Armenians by the Turks, there often are inherent constraints on the genocidal tendencies associated with colonialism. The colonizing power is frequently dependent on the colonized for labor and for the development of the territory as a functional economic entity. Such "functional" restraints on genocide, however, vary according to the context; for example, colonialists may regard indigenous hunter-gatherer societies as offering little value, or as posing an obstacle, to the economic or administrative development of a newly acquired territory. In such cases a more destructive form of genocide may be pursued, such as was perpetrated against the San of Southern Africa. An important question that arises, therefore, is whether the primary motive behind the Indonesian invasion was one of expansionism of an imperial kind, with genocidal methods used as part of the strategy or whether parallels can be drawn with an ideological form of genocide as typified by the Nazi Holocaust.
The UN Convention and the Recent History of East Timor
Although controversy continues about the definition and scope of the term genocide, the UN Convention remains in force, and it therefore continues to represent the critical test of any charge of genocide. Thus, it would seem appropriate to use the articles of the Convention as a framework to examine the extent of the human rights violations that have taken place in East Timor. Under Article II of the UN Convention (1948), five categories of actions are defined, with any one being sufficient to constitute an act of genocide if it is accompanied by "the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." What prima facie evidence is there that actions were taken in East Timor that may match these criteria?
Article II (a) specifies the killing of members of the target group. That there has been mass killing in East Timor is beyond question, although there is no precise documentation of the numbers killed. It is widely acknowledged that during the first few months of the initial Indonesian invasion, 60,000 East Timorese lost their lives. [29] Eyewitness accounts of the killing in Dili alone can leave no doubt that the mass slaughter was widespread, indiscriminate, and not limited to military targets. Amongst several verbatim eyewitness reports, Jardine quotes the Catholic Bishop of Dili as follows: "The soldiers who landed started killing everyone they could find. There were many dead bodies in the streets--all we could see were the soldiers killing, killing, killing." [30]
Systematic murder on the wharf, and the dumping of bodies en masse in the sea, were reported by several survivors. Young girls were actively sought out and raped, and torture and other abuses were rampant. Large numbers of civilians attempted to flee from Dill into the mountains, but many were killed by aerial bombings. [31]
Atrocities continued unabated following the initial invasion. It is estimated that approximately 200,000 East Timorese have lost their lives during the twenty-four years of Indonesian occupation. [32] If this estimate is close to the truth, then it means that between a third and a quarter of the East Timorese population have died (the population at the time of the invasion was estimated to be approximately 690,000 people). There can be little doubt that most of those killed were unarmed civilians. Although the tenacity of the East Timorese resistance undoubtedly surprised the Indonesian military, direct action between the opposing forces cannot account for anything but a fraction of the numbers killed. At the height of its strength during the initial war, Fretilin forces consisted of 2,500 regular soldiers, 7,000 part-time militia, and 10,000 reservists. [33] Many were killed, but a substantial number survived. Some continued the guerilla war, others returned to civilian life, and a number fled into exile. T he numbers of Indonesian soldiers who died during the intense period of the war was 2,000 of a total armed force of between 15,000 to 30,000. [34] Thus military casualties can only account for the minority of the estimated numbers who have died. Most East Timorese live in villages. The guerilla war has been waged from remote strongholds and jungle hide-outs. Thus, in most instances, it should not have been difficult for the Indonesian military to discriminate between armed combatants and civilian villagers, even if the latter were sympathetic to the cause of independence.
Article 111(c) of the Convention specifies the "deliberate inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." Substantial evidence has accrued that large numbers of East Timorese have died from disease and starvation in the wake of the conflict, [35] but there is no evidence that the Indonesians attempted to prevent this eventuality, nor did they call on international agencies such as the UN to assist in preventing these disasters. Allowing rampant disease and famine to overwhelm a population is considered in itself by some authorities as warranting a charge of genocide. [36] Strategies adopted by the Indonesian military (ABRI) to quell resistance in the years after the invasion continued to put the whole population of East Timor at risk. By 1977, ABRI had still not overcome the small number of Falantil guerrillas that remained. The Indonesian military thus mounted a campaign of "encirclement and annihilation" [37] with the aim of driving the c ivilian population to the coastal areas in order to isolate the resistance fighters in the mountainous hinterland. Intensive bombing and the use of chemicals resulted in the defoliation of forests and farmlands and the death of livestock. Military aircraft, recently acquired from Britain and other western nations, were employed in widespread and indiscriminate bombing. Large numbers of militants and civilians were killed, displaced, or incarcerated, and many were relocated to "guarded camps" or banished to the offshore island of Atauro. As early as 1979, there were 15 guarded camps housing over 300,000 displaced people. Life in the camps was characterized by starvation, disease, and forced labor. Later, the inmates of these camps were moved into "resettlement villages," thus disrupting existing social structures.
Falantil, the military wing of the resistance movement, gradually regrouped and re-organized. Its growing military successes led to the Indonesian military mounting a campaign referred to as a" fence of legs," in which a human shield of approximately 80,000 East Timorese civilians were forced to walk in line across the countryside in advance of Indonesian troops. Many unarmed civilians forming the human shield died of starvation and exhaustion. Mass slaughter of women and children by indiscriminate bombing occurred. Agriculture was disrupted across the territory, leading to food shortages. Similar operations occurred throughout the 1980s, but the military stalemate was never broken.
In the 1990s, the brutality of the repression became more visible in the international arena. The starkest example was the massacre in the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, November 12, 1991, when, without provocation, unarmed mourners were attacked and over 250 were killed. According to Max Stahl, a British journalist who captured the killings on videotape, the atrocity had all the hallmarks of a premeditated massacre. [38] It is alleged that in the immediate aftermath of the killings, the military embarked on the systematic killing of the wounded in a nearby hospital. Eyewitnesses reported that the Indonesian military crushed the skulls of the injured with rocks, ran over them with trucks, and stabbed them to death. Although Indonesia took some diplomatic action to stem the international wave of condemnation, two senior generals in the military declared that the massacre was necessary and that no regret was warranted. The attitude underlying such statements suggests that the Indonesian military had, for a long time, abandoned all restraint in repressing dissent in East Timor.
Evidence has accrued of the deliberate destruction of the cultural, social and ecological foundations of East Timorese life. Jardine [39] has documented the many strategies pursued to effect a policy of "Indonesianization" of East Timor society. The process of relocating large populations of displaced persons to resettlement villages has disrupted traditional hierarchies and clan relationships. Within the new villages, a regime of fear and intimidation has been maintained by the military, the police, and collaborators. Indonesian control of the economy has led to the exclusion of many indigenous East Timorese from their land and has limited their capacity to participate in commercial enterprises. The Indonesian policy of "transmigration" has encouraged ethnic Indonesians from more densely populated islands to settle in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and other outlying territories.
By 1992, an estimated 100,000 Indonesians, some "transmigrants," others independent migrants, were living in East Timor, out of a total population of 750,000. (Since the recent upheavals commenced in 1999, many Indonesians have fled the island.) The slaughter and flight of the ethnic Chinese minority during the Indonesian invasion left a vacuum in business leadership which was gradually filled by Indonesians and their sympathizers. The conversion of land titles from the Portuguese to the Indonesian system in the early 1990s has hastened the process of re-allocation of collectively used traditional land--considered by the authorities as not belonging to anyone--to Indonesians and pro-Indonesian officials. A large monopoly, P.T. Denok, in which high-ranking military and other Indonesian officials hold interests, controls the coffee industry and other subsidiary enterprises to the extent that it virtually runs the East Timorese economy. Local industry has been undermined by an increasing reliance on Indonesian imports for basic commodities. Thus, there appears to be good evidence for the claim that the East Timorese have been marginalized socially and economically within their own homeland.
Control of the educational system has been another manifestation of "Indonesianization." Bahasa Indonesia is the official language of schooling in East Timor, syllabi are biased in favor of the Indonesian perspective, and all students are obliged to memorize and recite Pancasila, the official credo of Indonesian society. Military and physical education and membership in Pramuka, the state-controlled scout organization, are all encouraged, thereby creating a culture of conformity and obedience among the young. [40]
When interviewed in his mountain stronghold in 1990, Xanana Gusmao, the Falantil leader who was subsequently captured and imprisoned in Jakarta, had this to say about the impact of Indonesianization on East Timorese life:
...there have been a lot of changes, a lot of difficulties for the people to continue their customs and traditions...Our people are essentially rooted in their culture and traditions. They have their own concepts of life, of existence, and live to realize them. They are impregnated spiritually and existentially with the concept...But the Maubere (East Timorese) people...feel that they are prevented from realizing, from living, from practicing their traditions, their customs, and this is what essentially offends our people....[41]
Article II (a) of the Genocide Convention specifies the intentional infliction of serious bodily or mental harm on members of the group. Over several years, organizations such as Amnesty International have gathered increasing evidence of extensive human rights abuses in East Timor, [42] although isolation of the territory from the outside world, and the strict control of the military over access to information on the island, has made it difficult to verify such accounts. Nevertheless, the consistency of the claims, and convergence in the accounts of numerous witnesses and victims, [43] has provided convincing evidence that human rights abuses have been extensive. As a psychiatrist in a mental health program providing assistance to East Timorese asylum seekers in Sydney, Australia, I have listened to extensive accounts of extreme human rights abuses in East Timor from clients. The detailed nature of the accounts, the consistency of the assertions made, and the absence of any motive in so doing other than to u nburden feelings of distress has lent them a sense of credibility. Thirty of these clients have completed structured inventories documenting the various forms of human rights abuses perpetrated on themselves, their families, and others. Repetitive records have been provided of night-time invasion of homes, public beatings, brutal apprehension of "suspects," kidnapping, "disappearances" and extrajudicial killings, and detentions. Families list large numbers of relatives or other close associates who have been injured or killed, or who are "missing." Torture has been widespread, with some asylum seekers exhibiting physical stigmata and disabilities arising from such abuses. Often, the same victim has been arrested and tortured repeatedly while the family is forced to flee the locality because of repeated threats and intimidation. Rape and other forms of sexual abuse of women appears to have been prevalent, with such violations often occurring in the presence of the family and other onlookers.
A significant number of East Timorese, numbering approximately 6,000 people, reside in Australia. As yet, only two studies have been undertaken that have focused on the mental reactions to human rights abuses and displacement among the East Timorese. A Melbourne study, [44] based on impressions by clinicians, suggested that a high percentage of East Timorese exiles accessing a refugee service were suffering from trauma-related symptoms of stress and depression. A systematic ongoing study undertaken by our group in Sydney, in which structured questionnaires and interview schedules have been used, has revealed high rates of depressive and post-traumatic stress symptoms in East Timorese asylum seekers. The high rate of post-traumatic stress is particularly significant, since that form of psychological disturbance is closely tied to exposure to torture and other forms of egregious human rights abuses. East Timorese have not been exposed to psychiatry of any kind, so that respondents would not be in a position to simulate symptom patterns recognized by western psychiatrists; thus, consistency in the pattern of post-traumatic stress symptoms described by East Timorese clients adds credibility to their reports. In the minds of these respondents, there is no doubt that the persecution they have suffered has been motivated by genocidal designs on the part of the Indonesian military. Many respondents also have intimated that they regard Australia as complicit in the persecution of the East Timorese, an issue that will be revisited below.
Article II (d) and (e) of the Genocide Convention specify acts that prevent births within a group and that forcibly transfer children from the group with the intent of weakening the foundations of the group's existence. Writing for the East Timor Human Rights Centre, Sisson [45] has documented accounts of forced sterilization of women and the implementation of coercive family planning programs in East Timor. Injectable, long-acting chemical forms of contraception have been promoted by a special birth control program implemented across the territory. It should be noted, however, that Indonesia has initiated a population control program, Program Keluarga Berencana, the "KB" program, at a national level, raising the question of whether its implementation in East Timor should be regarded in a special light. Sissons has argued that the KB program in East Timor is distinct both in its character and consequences, specifically because it has been implemented within a context of intimidation and widespread human figh ts abuses, and with direct support from the military.
According to Sissons, two historical phases of the violation of women's rights in East Timor can be identified. From 1975 to the mid-1980s, repeated allegations were made of rape, forced impregnation, killing and mutilation of pregnant women, and covert sterilization. Since the 1980s, reports have emphasized coercive contraception and denial of information or choice about family planning. The detailed account of the suffering of East Timorese women by Aditjondro [46] adds further weight to the assertions made by Sissons.
No claims have been made of a large-scale removal of children from East Timorese families. On the other hand, there is every reason to suspect that the rights of children have been violated on a large scale in East Timor. Malnutrition and communicable diseases are endemic in East Timor, and children are at most risk of the adverse long-term consequences of such afflictions. The spread of disease can be traced at least in part to the ravages of the warfare waged by the Indonesian military. [47] The campaign of extrajudicial killings, detention, and displacement has led to the mass breakup of families and kinship groups, and has left thousands of orphans and single-parent families in its wake. Exile groups in Australia, for example, often consist of "makeshift" family arrangements in which distant relatives or acquaintances take charge of orphaned or separated children. There is no doubt that the war in East Timor, together with widespread repression and displacement of the population, has posed an active thre at to the psychosocial and physical development of the territory's children; such violations would undoubtedly contravene international instruments such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989.
Responsibility of World Powers
As indicated above, repeated assertions have been made about the complicity of the world powers in the unraveling of the human disaster in East Timor. There is substantial evidence to suggest that the major powers actively condoned the Indonesian invasion.48 Gerald Ford, then U.S. president, and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, met with Soeharto a few days prior to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975. During the subsequent war, the western powers provided military supplies to the Indonesians, who were running short on arms. Britain and other western governments continued to supply military aircraft-British-made Broncos were instrumental in the indiscriminate bombings in which large numbers of civilians were killed in successive Indonesian military campaigns in East Timor. Indonesia's economic ties and trade with Japan, Canada, the U.S., Britain, and other European countries have strengthened throughout the period of the occupation of East Timor. Multilateral economic aid programs to Indones ia have also been in effect throughout this period. The initial condemnation of the Indonesian invasion at the UN General Assembly was not supported by the Security Council, where the major western powers vetoed the resolution. A succession of subsequent UN resolutions calling for negotiations on East Timor have failed, until recently, to lead to effective action, mainly because of the inertia of the Great Powers.
The role of Australia, the major power m the region other than Indonesia, has attracted particular criticism. [49] Accounts vary somewhat about Australia's stance in the initial invasion of East Timor, particularly with respect to the role of the Labor government of the time. Whitlam, then the Labor Party Prime Minister, who had championed the case for independence for Papua New Guinea, is reported to have commented that an independent East Timor was not "viable." Communiques from the Australian ambassador in Indonesia at the time dearly favored pragmatism in accepting an Indonesian takeover of East Timor. Indonesia's early atrocities on the western border of East Timor, including the alleged massacre of an Australian news crew, were minimized and obfuscated in the Australian parliament and media. One report suggested that Soeharto had promised Whitlam not to mount a military invasion of East Timor. Peacock, the Shadow Foreign Minister in the Conservative Opposition, allegedly met senior Indonesian officials in Bali and strongly encouraged the annexation of East Timor. Peacock gave assurances that the Whitlam government was about to fall, and that the Conservative government, once it had acceded, would support Indonesia's dominion over East Timor--a prediction that soon eventuated. Since the invasion, successive Australian governments led by both major parties have stood alone among western nations in giving full recognition to Indonesia's rule over East Timor. Throughout, the Australian government has promoted closer ties with Indonesia, forging both military and economic agreements. Most controversial has been the conclusion of a bilateral agreement with Indonesia on the exploitation of oil reserves in the Timor Gap, a stretch of sea separating Northern Australia and East Timor--in spite of Portugal mounting a challenge in the international court on the basis that it retained legal authority over East Timor. Paradoxically, successive Australian governments have rejected asylum claims by East Timorese exiles on the grounds that Portugal, the colonial power, retains responsibility for their welfare.
Classifying Events in East Timor: Problems and Paradoxes
It is beyond the scope of this article, and the expertise of the author, to attempt to reach a definitive judgment as to whether there is a case in international law for a charge of genocide in relation to East Timor--future events will determine whether such a case will be mounted. As I have noted throughout, however, allegations of genocide have been made on a regular basis and from a variety of quarters. In 1997-1998 a photographic exposition titled "Stop Operation Annihilation," that juxtaposed images from the Nazi Holocaust and the East Timor tragedy, toured several large centers around the world. [50] Whether the term genocide can be used legitimately to characterize the human disaster that has unfolded in East Timor depends both on the strength of the evidence that can be documented and on the definition of genocide that is applied. Chalk and Jonassohn have outlined the difficulties encountered in verifying claims of genocide. [51] Detailed records are rarely kept, and even if they are, there are usua lly major discrepancies between the accounts of suspected perpetrators and those of victims or their advocates. It needs to be acknowledged that the major sources of public evidence available at present on East Timor, and on which the present article has drawn, have been produced by critics of the Indonesian occupation. Having worked clinically with the East Timorese, I am avowedly in support of any initiatives to prevent further human rights abuses and trauma to that community and the comments offered herein need to be judged in that light.
Definitional issues also bedevil the question of whether the East Timorese situation can be characterized as a genocide or not. If a broad, humanistic, or popular perspective is adopted, as proposed by Charny, then events in East Timor could easily be described as genocide. A proportionately large number of persons have been killed, and many more have been subjected to a concerted military program that has repeatedly endangered the lives and undermined the fundamental structures necessary for the survival and continuation of the East Timorese as a people. The target group has been clearly identified, most of the victims have been defenseless throughout the Indonesian occupation, and the scale of the violence directed at the society as a whole is grossly disproportionate to the objective of containing a small insurgency group.
Difficulty still remains, however, in identifying with clarity the intent of the Indonesians in East Timor. A case of genocide is more easily sustained when the perpetrators have articulated an overt ideology aimed at annihilating a specific group, the Nazi Holocaust being the clearest example. Even when polemic is documented, distinctions need to be made between rhetoric and an explicit intent to follow through with a program of action. In the late twentieth century, this type of evidence is unlikely to be forthcoming.
We thus face a paradox in world history in which the advances made by the human rights movement unintentionally may have created conditions in which transgressions become progressively more difficult to prosecute. In prior epochs, for example, during the Inquisition in Europe, when no international conventions against genocide existed, rulers and religious leaders could express openly and with impunity their intent to destroy a group simply because of the group's characteristics, the most obvious at that time being adherence to a particular religious faith. Even as late as the first half of the twentieth century, explicitly racist statements by officials of government could be made with impunity in most countries of the world. Drawing extensively on public utterances by Australian officials earlier in the century in which explicitly racist and discriminatory sentiments were expressed, Tatz has made a compelling case for a charge that genocide was perpetrated against the Aborigines of that country [52] Nation al and international laws against racism and discrimination now would not only proscribe such public statements, but render the authors liable to prosecution. Nevertheless, although the legal and judicial machinery to prosecute perpetrators of genocide exists, the capacity to gather evidence, to apprehend those who have been indicted, and hence to effect judgements remains weak--as evidenced by the attempts to prosecute war criminals and perpetrators of genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. One unintended effect of establishing international human rights laws such as the Genocide Convention may have been, therefore, to put national leaders on notice of the risk they face if they declare their intent to commit such crimes. Thus, given the contemporary zeitgeist, and the threat inherent in international conventions, the likelihood of proving a case of "ideological" genocide may become increasingly remote. Instead, would-be perpetrators are encouraged by the existing prohibitions and sanctions to disguis e their motives and obfuscate their intentions.
Thus, half a century after the formulation of the Genocide Convention, there may be a need to reconsider some of its defining articles so that the instrument is more consonant with contemporary historical and political realities. Perhaps a more contemporary test of culpability would be the requirements that national leaders assume the responsibility of preventing strategies mounted by their military that, by any commonsense reasoning, could result in a threat to the existence of a defined group. In addition, in spite of the technical difficulties involved, it may become necessary to accept the principle that, under certain circumstances, genocidal intent can be inferred from the set of strategies used to undermine the viability of a group. Intentions may be complex and multifaceted; for example, the Timor debacle might be best understood as a late form of colonial or imperial expansionism in which genocidal massacres, ethnocide, and destruction of culture formed elements. It seems likely that one intent behi nd the Indonesian campaign was to absorb East Timor into the body of the Indonesian state at any cost. That process was pursued with little restraint and with a disregard for the lives, safety, dignity, human rights, and culture of the indigenous people. In the East Timor context, the prolonged period over which military operations were carried out, the methods used to effect them, and the consequences to the indigenous population might all be construed as evidence of a broad strategy--even if ill-defined--to fundamentally disrupt the basis of East Timorese life so as to assimilate the territory and its people fully into Indonesia.
Is Realpolitik a Defense?
The unconstrained brutality of the Indonesian regime in East Timor might be attributable to both internal and external factors. Since the fall of the Soeharto regime, public criticism of its rule has become more vociferous, with widespread allegations being made of corruption, nepotism, and a disregard throughout Indonesia of democratic principles, institutions of justice, and mechanisms for defending human fights. All these elements of despotic rule became evident soon after Soeharto took power and initiated a reign of terror against what was depicted as a communist threat inside the country. The ensuing repression and massacres led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians in the mid-1960s. The western powers condoned these early acts of the regime, and perhaps by so doing positioned themselves on the slippery slope of acquiescence to any further acts of brutal repression by the Soeharto government.
From the perspective of realpolitik, it is easy to see why the international powers, including Australia, chose to turn a blind eye to the worst excesses of the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor. At the height of the Cold War, in the wake of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and the accession of anti-western regimes in that country, Laos, and Cambodia, Indonesia was regarded as a critical bulwark against the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Australia, in particular, feared the consequences of instability in Indonesia, by far the most populous country in the region. The fragile unity of a newly established Indonesian Republic, the ethnic diversity of its population, and the strategic importance of its military and economic alliance with the West undoubtedly persuaded the major powers to ignore the aspirations of East Timor, generally regarded as a backwater whose only relevance was as a potential trouble spot if those with socialist and nationalistic leanings gained ascendancy on the half-island. The "neatest" solution, then, from the perspective of the world powers, was the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. Once locked into support for the Soeharto regime's invasion and occupation, the West could, at most, voice ambivalent and ineffectual protests about aspects of Indonesian rule. Australia, in particular, exploited the situation by strengthening military and economic ties with Indonesia. So emboldened was Australia in forging that alliance that it felt no obligation to consult with the Timorese leadership in exile or the acknowledged legal authority, Portugal, in reaching a pact with Indonesia regarding the exploitation of oil deposits in the Timor Gap.
Will history judge the policy of realpolitik pursued by the world powers as justified? Can the pursuit of "larger" interests--maintaining the balance of power, fostering regional security, and ensuring economic development--be condoned? The two key questions--whether Indonesia is guilty of genocide and whether the West is complicit--may, in fact, have one answer. Unless dismissed as a cosmetic charade, the creation of the United Nations and the establishment of a large body of conventions and international instruments aimed at the protection of human rights--developments in which the Western powers have provided the key leadership--have, in effect, changed the rules of the international political "game." Since the definitive point of adopting the genocide convention, no nation can claim impunity for its actions based solely on the principle of pragmatic interest or regional security. Although full and systematic information has been difficult to gather in East Timor, there is overwhelming evidence that massiv e human rights violations have occurred on the island throughout the period of Indonesian rule. The period of oppression has been prolonged--twenty-four years--and during that time, evidence of human rights violations was brought repeatedly to the attention of the West by tireless advocates for East Timor, including respected academics such as Noam Chomsky and Nobel Laureates Jose Ramos Horta and Bishop Carlos Bello. There can be little doubt that the West has failed to acknowledge crimes against humanity in East Timor, and that countries such as Australia have acted hypocritically by rushing to the defense of peoples such as the Kuwaitis and the Kosovars while ignoring the plight of their closest neighbors, the East Timorese.
Claiming that the West, and Australia in particular, has been complicit in the genocide of the East Timorese carries with it many implications. The term genocide has entered the popular lexicon of Western discourse, and in that context, it has an emotive and evocative force. Genocide has become one of the rallying points for the expression of a postmodernist commitment to the preservation of human diversity, cultural pluralism, and the identity of minority groups. Claims of genocide can quickly provoke public outrage and garner support for a cause. In that way, charges of genocide in recent publications, documentary films, and exhibitions have helped to bring the East Timorese tragedy more forcefully to public attention. Nevertheless, such charges may have unpredictable effects at the level of national and international politics. Western governments might be offended or intimidated by claims of complicity in genocide, with such charges thus leading to further minimization and obfuscation of the issues at sta ke. There is also a risk that the gap between a broad, humanistic usage of the term genocide [53] and the stricter UN definition may threaten the core meaning of the term and thereby undermine its future utility.
Since the Genocide Convention was adopted, a large body of international instruments have been established that aim to proscribe human rights abuses. Machinery has been created to prosecute offenders, such as the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, thereby providing mechanisms other than the Genocide Convention for indicting those suspected of actions subsumed under the broader category of "crimes against humanity." Thus, proof that genocide has occurred in East Timor may not be essential to pursuing charges of human rights abuses against suspected offenders. Most importantly, ongoing debate about genocide should not obscure the reality that the East Timorese have been subjected to appalling levels of suffering, and that the international community has an urgent responsibility to rectify the wrongs of the past.
DERRICK SILOVE discusses the history of the case of violence in East Timor in relation to various conceptions of genocide in the law and in social science. During 1999, East Timor underwent a massive convulsion with much of the infrastructure being destroyed by militia groups and large segments of the population being displaced from their homes. Evidence is mounting of mass murder and other human fights abuses. The recent crisis brings into focus repeated claims of genocidal actions during twenty-five years of Indonesian rule. The author evaluates the basis of that claim in relation to definitions of genocide and the possible political and territorial motivations behind the extensive human rights violations that have been perpetrated in the territory. It is possible that Indonesia was not intent on ideological genocide in the sense most clearly represented by the Nazi Holocaust, but instead was motivated to consolidate the hegemony of the new nation over its far-flung and culturally diverse territories. Never theless, whether or not a claim of genocide can be sustained, there appears to be no doubt that widespread crimes against humanity have been committed against the East Timorese population. Questions of responsibility undoubtedly will focus on the Indonesian military and political leaders of the time, but issues of complicity by the international powers also warrant attention.
Notes
(1.) Noam Chomsky, "Introduction," in East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, ed. Mathew Jardine (Tucson: Odonian Press, 1995), 7.
(2.) Jim Aubrey," Complicity in Genocide: The case against Australia in East Timor's genocide," in Free East Timor, ed. Jim Aubrey (Sydney: Random House Australia, 1998), 279-294.
(3.) Derrick Silove, "Health and Human Rights of the East Timorese," The Lancet (London, 353: June 12, 1999): 2067.
(4.) Amnesty International Annual Report, Indonesia and East Timor, 1999 (www.amnesty.org).
(5.) Noam Chomsky, "East Timor," in The Chomsky Reader, ed. J. Peck (New York: Serpents Tail! Pantheon Books, 1992), 303-311.
(6.) Chomsky, East Timor, 306.
(7.) Michelle Turner, Telling East Timor: Personal Testimonies 2942-1992 (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1992).
(8.) John Pilger and David Munro, Death of a Nation: The Timor Conspiracy, Central Television, London, February 1994.
(9.) George Aditjondro, "The Silent Suffering of Our Timorese Sisters," in Free East Timor, ed. Jim Aubrey (Sydney: Random House Australia, 1998), 243-266.
(10.) Jose Ramos Horta, "National Press Club Speech, Canberra, 1984" in Free East Timor, ed. Jim Aubrey (Sydney: Random House, 1998), 103-122.
(11.) Ken Fry," Lest We Forget East Timor," in Free East Timor, ed. Jim Aubrey (Sydney: Random House, 1998), 31-73.
(12.) Jardine, East Timor.
(13.) Amnesty International, Indonesia and East Timor, www.amnesty.org.
(14.) Mark Dodd, "Indonesian Militia cuts off 60,000 from outside help," Sydney Morning_Herald, July 10, 1999: 1.
(15.) Aubrey, "Complicity," 279-294.
(16.) Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1944), 92.
(17.) Alan Berger," The Holocaust: The Ultimate and Archetypal Genocide," in Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review, ed. Israel Charny (New York: Facts on File, 1988), 59-88.
(18.) Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 44-49.
(19.) Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 11.
(20.) Vahakn N. Dadrian, "A Typology of Genocide," International Review of Modern Sociology 5 (Fall 1975), 201-212.
(21.) Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 23, 26.
(22.) Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 26.
(23.) Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 15.
(24.) Irving Louis Horowitz, Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), 17.
(25.) Israel W. Charny, "The Study of Genocide," in Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review, ed. Israel Charny (New York: Facts on File, 1988), 4.
(26.) Ben Whitaker, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission of Human Rights, 1985.
(27.) Leo Kuper, "Theories of Genocide" in Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin, 1981), 45.
(28.) Helen Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and Critical Responses," in Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide, ed. Israel Charny (Boulder, CO and London: Westview Press, 1984), 4.
(29.) Jardine, East Timor, 35.
(30.) Jardine, East Timor, 31-32.
(31.) Jardine, East Timor, 34.
(32.) Catholic Institute for International Relations, East Timor: The Continuing Betrayal (Nottingham: Russel Press, 1996), 9.
(33.) Jardine, East Timor, 53.
(34.) Jardine, East Timor, 35.
(35.) Catholic Institute for International Relations, East Timor, 10.
(36.) Charny, The Study of Genocide, 3.
(37.) Jardine, East Timor, 16.
(38.) Jardine, East Timor, 16.
(39.) Jardine, East Timor, 57.
(40.) Jardine, East Timor, 62.
(41.) Robert Domm, "East Timor: To Resist Is to Win," in Free East Timor, ed. Jim Aubrey (Sydney: Random House Australia, 1998), 139.
(42.) Al Report, Indonesia and East Timor, www.amnesty.org.
(43.) Turner, Telling East Timor.
(44.) Victoria Foundation for Torture Survivors," The East Timorese: Clinical And Social Assessments of Applicants for Asylum" in The Mental Health and Well-Being of On-Shore Asylum Seekers in Australia, ed. Derrick Silove and Zachary Steel (Sydney: Psychiatry Research and Teaching Unit, 1998), 24-26.
(45.) Miranda B. Sissons, From One Day to Another Violations of Women's Reproductive and Sexual Rights in East Timor (Melbourne: East Timor Human Rights Centre, 1997).
(46.) Aditjondro, Silent Suffering, 243-266.
(47.) Silove, Health and Human Rights, 2067.
(48.) Chomsky, "Introduction," 7-15.
(49.) Ramos Horta, "National Press Club," 279-294.
(50.) Aubrey, "Complicity," 279.
(51.) Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 42.
(52.) Colin Tatz, Research discussion paper: Genocide in Australia (Fyshwick: Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Studies, 1999), 6.
(53.) Charny, The Study of Genocide, 4.
Publication: Human Rights Review Publication Date: 01-APR-00 Author: Silove, Derrick
Images added by ETLJB: The murder of Joaquim Bernardino Guterres by Indonesian police. Go here to see the whole series of images of this brutal cold-blooded murder.
East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin
Civil Liberties Australia Monday 28 July 2008 (1:07 pm) By Timotio de Deus, Director, Judicial System Monitoring Program*, Timor Leste - The joint Indonesia-Timor Leste Truth and Friendship Commission, which has just reported, fell far short of what it could have achieved, says Timotio de Deus of the Judicial System Monitoring Program of Timor Leste. There should now be a process of bringing allegedly guilty parties before public courts, he says
The much-anticipated release of the Truth and Friendship Commission (CTF) final report was released in July. The Commission was established by the governments of Indonesia and Timor Leste (East Timor). It sought to establish the truth about violence that surrounded East Timor‚s independence vote. We in the Judicial System Monitoring Program have conducted interviews on the CTF with victims and community representatives from several districts, which inform this analysis of the outcome.
Reviewing evidence examined by previous investigations into the conflict, the CTF report draws some familiar conclusions. Most notably, it finds that in 1999 the Indonesian military directed Timorese militia campaigns responsible for gross human rights violations. This is worth celebrating as a reversal of the official Indonesian position that the violence was solely a result of internal conflict.
The report is also even-handed in recognising its own limitations. Echoing previous statements by JSMP and other commentators, the process of hearing testimony is acknowledged as flawed. Findings appear to reflect some Commissioners’ frustrations with the grandstanding and evasiveness of witnesses, and with the inability to pursue sensitive lines of questioning.
The CTF was empowered to recommend amnesties for those perpetrators it called who showed remorse and cooperated fully. It is a measure of the incomplete and often self-serving narratives put forward by such individuals that it was concluded that in no case had the criteria been satisfied, and so no such recommendations for amnesty could be made.
The Commission’s mandate did not extend to reparations, as did the more rigorous CAVR** process before it. Useful though it is to have an agreed history of events, the process is seen by many as further sidelining the voices and interests of victims. Even the report’s laudable recommendation for a public apology by heads of state – an important symbolic step toward redress – has seemingly met with official resistance.
Father Ernesto Barreto, whose parish in Suai still suffers many ill effects from the 1999 violence, said: “The CAVR had the integrity to pay attention to the victims and their families. However, the CTF is aimed at protecting leaders who were directly or indirectly involved in the humanitarian crisis that resulted from occupation by Indonesia. They should be ashamed of this attempt to protect themselves: victims will continue to suffer this trauma forever and the CTF brings them no benefits at all.”
Others have indicated a lack of grassroots education about the CTF process that led to much confusion and likely also to an incomplete assessment of the impact of pre-independence violence. Martinho Amaral, who was injured during attacks in Covalima during 1999, said: “We are ordinary citizens who don’t really understand it; we thought that the CTF is a continuation of the CAVR because many of the people are the same.”
The report recommends investigation of disappearances from this period and documentation of the conflict: these are laudable measures. However, instead of emphasizing the creation of new legal processes and entities, critics feel that it should instead provide more practical, compensatory measures.
Victims spokeswoman Anita Tilman dos Santos said: “For families of the victims of 1999 like us, the existence of the CTF makes us feel as if those who died are not being given any value by the government. This is only for the leaders of our nation – ordinary citizens like us can only sit and look at the ground and ask: when will we get justice if the government lacks the good will?”
Among those interviewed, there were many who felt that the need for strong diplomatic ties between Indonesia and East Timor should not supersede the call to bring perpetrators to justice. Liquica district coordinator Alberto Gomes said: “The relationship between Indonesia and Timor Leste can be nurtured as per normal, which doesn‚t mean we have to sacrifice the truth-finding process and justice through the courts.”
In accordance with the Commission’s terms of reference, the report did not name those responsible for coordinating the violence; nor does it advocate prosecutions. A number people spoke of their belief that too many questions yet remain unanswered in the interest of political expediency.
Maubara resident and 1999 victim Filomena de Jesus Santa said that, in her opinion: “Justice should be upheld by a court that is open to the public. There is no reason to have good relations with a nation that has committed serious human rights violations if they don’t want to reveal the truth before a court. Why should our country be afraid of them?”
The CTF was intended to put an end to national debate over the cause and effect of East Timor’s troubled rise to nationhood, though clearly it has not quelled public outrage. Politicians on both sides have played down the prospect of a tribunal to further investigate the crimes against humanity that were unquestionably visited upon the Timorese people. Despite the unwillingness of government, community support for a court-based approach is unyielding.
Domingas Mouzinho, a survivor of the Suai church killings in 1999, pleaded for “justice through the courts – I don‚t care if it is an international or national court, the important thing is the perpetrators of crimes need to be brought to justice so the victims like us can feel satisfied.”
It is now incumbent on the architects of the CTF process, both Indonesian and Timorese, to make of it more than a rhetorical gesture. Whilst the report contains some difficult truths, it will take a more sustained effort to fully confront the legacy of violence and injustice with which so many still live. Much as political leaders may wish to leave the past behind, for many this will not be possible until justice is delivered to the victims, and served upon the perpetrators.
Rita Pereira dos Santos, who lost several family members to militia attacks on Liquica, summing up her views on the Commission, said: “We, the family members, will be very upset if our demands are not realised and if our own government does not listen to us. It is like we are being killed all over again, not in a direct sense like the victims of 1999, but maybe this type of suffering is even worse because it is enduring and we will think about it forever.”
– Timotio de Deus, Director, JSMP
* The Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP) was set up in early 2001 in Dili, East Timor. Through court monitoring, the provision of legal analysis and thematic reports on the development of the judicial system, and outreach activities, JSMP aims to contribute to the ongoing evaluation and building of the justice system in East Timor.
** The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR – the Portuguese acronym) was set up in 2001 and functioned from 2002 until its dissolution in December 2005. It was an independent, statutory authority led by seven East Timorese Commissioners and mandated by UNTAET Regulation 2001/10 to undertake truth seeking for the period 1974-1999, facilitate community reconciliation for less serious crimes, and report on its work and findings and make recommendations. Its 2,800 page report entitled 'Chega!' was presented to the President, Parliament and Government of Timor-Leste following its completion in October 2005.
http://www.cla.asn.au/0805/index.php/articles/2008/timor-leste-justice-not-well-served
Image added by ETLJB: Indonesian-backed militia rampage in Dili in 1999.
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